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INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to contribute to this celebration of the seventy-fifth anni-
versary of the Federal Rules. As one who has been something of a rulemaking 
insider for over twenty percent of the seventy-five years since the Federal 
Rules came into effect, I suppose I incline towards being an apologist—at least 
regarding recent developments.  
 
† Horace O. Coil (’57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
  
1692 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1691 
 
I intend to focus mainly on the introduction and evolution of broad dis-
covery. In part, that’s because discovery has been an almost constant focus 
of rulemaking for forty years and also is the most acute pressure point in 
the acidic relations the United States has had with the rest of the world due 
to distinct procedural arrangements. In addition, our broad discovery can 
serve as an avatar for the most aggressive visions of the peculiar American 
institution of private litigation as a force for good or evil. Not surprisingly, 
my general view is that the rulemakers have sought (fairly successfully) to 
steer a middle course between the most aggressive supporters and critics. 
Today, though, it may be that Silicon Valley is the source of greater chal-
lenges for discovery rules than either camp of critics. 
I take my theme for this Essay1 from Edward Bellamy. In 1888, fifty 
years before the Federal Rules went into effect, Bellamy published a book 
called Looking Backward.2 Many today have never read it, perhaps never 
even heard of it. But when it appeared, it was an instant and enduring 
sensation. According to Erich Fromm, 
[I]t is one of the few books ever published that created almost immediately 
on its appearance a political mass movement. Between 1890 and 1891 one 
hundred and sixty-five ‘Bellamy Clubs’ sprang up all over the United States, 
devoted to the discussion and propagation of the aims expressed in Looking 
Backward. The Populist Party, which at its peak attracted over one million 
votes throughout the States, was to a large extent influenced by Bellamy’s 
ideas, and got many of its votes from his adherents.3 
I invoke Bellamy because his book provides a contrast for our reflections 
in this symposium. The book is a first-person description by a wealthy 
Bostonian from 1888 who, due to miraculous circumstances, goes to sleep 
that year and awakens in 2000 to find himself in an utterly transformed 
 
1 This is an essay in the sense that it deals with a variety of topics that have been exhaustively 
discussed in legal literature for a century. I do not intend to try to provide comprehensive citations 
for what I say and will often draw on my personal experience as Associate Reporter of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules since 1996. I should emphasize that I speak here solely for 
myself and not for anyone else, in particular the Advisory Committee. In addition, I note that this 
was written in September 2013, before the public comment period for pending rule amendment 
proposals had produced much commentary. There was a great deal of commentary later, and the 
amendment proposals were revised.  
2 See generally EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (Signet ed., 1960) (1888). 
3 Erich Fromm, Foreword to BELLAMY, supra note 2, at vi. Fromm adds that it was the most 
popular book in late nineteenth century America after Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Ben-Hur and that 
Charles Beard, John Dewey, and Edward Weeks independently listed the book as second on their 
rankings of “most influential” nineteenth century books, eclipsed only by Karl Marx’s Das Kapital. 
See id. at v. 
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Boston. Although the “Robber Baron” epoch into which the narrator was 
born was characterized by divisions between rich and poor considerably 
starker than those in the United States today, Bellamy’s Boston of 2000 was 
completely different. Humanity had finally learned the lessons that the mid-
nineteenth century “rationalists” had urged, and everyone was contented, 
well-fed, and well-supported—with retirement at age forty-five. Not only 
was there universal health care, but almost all other needs were met, and 
people led fulfilled lives. Had he been able to visit to the actual Boston of 
2000, Bellamy would surely have been sorely disappointed. The conse-
quences of the Great Recession since then would only deepen his distress. 
As Voltaire supposedly said, “the perfect is the enemy of the good,” and 
utopians may be the bane of all reformers who operate in the world as it is 
rather than as it might be in the imagination of those with uncommon 
imaginations. But it seems to me a useful device to reflect on our seventy-
five-year experiment with the Federal Rules by thinking about how the 
framers of that breakthrough, who almost surely were familiar with Bellamy’s 
book, would react to our contemporary litigation world if they could visit it. 
Would they be similarly disappointed? My guess is that they would not—
though they would probably be quite surprised by many things that we take 
as commonplace. 
In this Essay, I first sketch what appear to be the attitudes of the framers. 
I then explore what has happened to change litigation since 1938 and 
consider the ways in which discovery reform has responded to the challenges 
of those developments. Finally, I will explore the new discovery challenges 
of the twenty-first century that may justify a reconsideration of some 
assumptions about getting “all” the relevant information. I conclude that the 
gradual adjustments we have seen and may see are true to the framers’ 
vision and don’t deserve denunciation, even by those who think some of 
them wrong-headed. 
I. THE BEGINNINGS 
Professor Subrin cogently set the scene for the rulemakers in a 1997 
presentation: 
Although the drafters did have large cases in mind, I think it is fair to say 
that the drafters as a group would be amazed at how immense many cases 
now become and how prominent a role discovery plays in that process. 
Some things they could not have known: the advent of copying machines 
and computers; the huge size of law firms and litigation departments; the 
many factors leading to the large overhead of major firms; and the enor-
mous growth and change in substantive law. I think the drafters also would 
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have been surprised at the role of civil claims as, to use Professor Hazard’s 
words, ‘an integral part of law enforcement in this country . . . [T]he 
scope of discovery determines the scope of effective law enforcement in 
many fields regulated by law.’4 
Regarding discovery, the record confirms what Subrin said. Discovery 
surely existed before 1938. There were even treatises about it in the nine-
teenth century.5 As shown in a three-part study by Dean Langdell in the 
1890s, however, the discovery provisions that existed then look now like a 
cavalcade of minutiae.6 A comprehensive 1928 examination of the same basic 
subject by a young Professor Fleming James, stressing American provisions, 
does not appear much different.7 Surely the variety of specific differences 
and qualifications that these articles enumerate were important to the 
practitioners of the day, but they seem alien to us now. 
The Federal Rules broke with that past, enabled by the 1934 adoption of 
the Rules Enabling Act, which Professor Burbank has chronicled so ably.8 
Although the Enabling Act’s path to adoption was long and tendentious, it 
was not much preoccupied with the detail of the rules to be adopted. In 
particular, the Enabling Act did not focus on discovery.9 Roscoe Pound’s 
famous 1906 speech to the American Bar Association, which many credited 
with prompting the reform drive that led to adoption of the Enabling Act 
nearly thirty years later, similarly did not focus on discovery, even though it 
enumerated myriad reasons why the American public would be dissatisfied 
with the administration of justice and particularly criticized extreme 
adversarial behavior.10 
 
4 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 743-44 (1998) (quoting REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE 
ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter, Mar. 30–
31, 1995)). This article was a presentation during the conference on discovery held by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules at Boston College on September 4–5, 1997. 
5 See generally EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY (1885) 
(examining discovery in English courts). 
6 See generally C.C. Langdell, Discovery Under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875 (pts. 1–3), 11 
HARV. L. REV. 137, 205 (1897), 12 HARV. L. REV. 151 (1898). 
7 See generally Fleming James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929). 
8 See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
9 See Subrin, supra note 4, at 692-94. 
10 See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906). Many of the causes Pound discussed were universal, such as “the 
necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules,” id. at 397, and the “popular impatience of 
restraint,” id. at 401-02. Among native propensities, he reported, “the worst feature of American 
procedure is the lavish granting of new trials.” Id. at 413. The absence of significant opportunities 
for discovery did not seem similarly important to Pound, although he did denounce trial by surprise. 
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Everyone recognizes that the post-1938 reality has brought discovery to 
the fore. After denouncing “fishing expeditions” in 1911,11 the Supreme 
Court concluded within a decade of the adoption of the Federal Rules that 
“the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’” should not prevent discovery.12 
In 1965, Professor James published the first edition of his civil procedure 
treatise, which continues to thrive to this day under the leadership of 
Professor Hazard. In his preface, Professor James explains that a new 
treatise was needed because Dean Clark’s code pleading treatise had been 
eclipsed by developments in litigation; pleading problems (Clark’s focus) 
had yielded in importance to the needs of discovery.13 One “great develop-
ment” that explained this shift and “changed the face of procedure” was “the 
federal rules of civil procedure together with their many state counterparts.”14 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY LITIGATION REALITY 
“[L]itigation in the federal courts has become a world unimagined in 1938.” 
              –Arthur Miller15 
Since contemporary discovery functions in the broader world of litigation, 
it is useful to reflect on some of the distinctive trends that have emerged 
since the framers did their groundbreaking work. At least four develop-
ments deserve attention: the “heroic model” of litigation in the Civil Rights 
era, the rise of private attorneys general, the beginning of mass tort litigation, 
and the increase in corporate litigation. Some of them may, indeed, have 
depended in part on changes wrought by the Federal Rules. For our purposes, 
the key question will be whether discovery played a critical role in this 
development.  
Discovery surely was identified early on as a source of problems; the 1951 
Prettyman Report identified coping with huge volumes of evidence as one 
of the hallmarks of “protracted litigation” that judges should strive to 
control.16 But as we continue to deal with efforts to constrain over-discovery, it 
 
11 See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911). 
12 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
13 FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, at v (1st ed. 1965). 
14 Id.; see also id. at 184 (“The federal discovery provisions have been adopted in whole or 
substantial part by more states than has any other part of those rules.”). 
15 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2010). 
16 See Prettyman Report, 13 F.R.D. 62, 74-79 (1951) (referring to “bulk documentary evi-
dence”); see also The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131 (1951) (examining 
discovery problems in big cases).  
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is useful to remember that the concerns have been with us almost as long as 
the Rules. 
A. The Heroic Model: Civil Rights Litigation 
Brown v. Board of Education was the ultimate symbol of using litigation 
to surmount barriers to progress. In a way it has become a cultural icon; “it 
is surely the only Supreme Court case that has its own National Historic 
Site.”17 Despite its singularity, it is fair to say that such litigation was the 
model Professor Chayes contemplated when he examined the procedural 
implications of “public law litigation” in his 1976 article.18 For others, such 
as Professor Fiss, that sort of litigation was the main or sole legitimate 
function of the public court system.19 
One way of looking at the middle third of the twentieth century is that 
it was a period that persistently aspired toward the sorts of ideals that 
Edward Bellamy embraced. Roosevelt’s New Deal, Truman’s Fair Deal, 
Kennedy’s New Frontier, and Johnson’s Great Society each had aspects that 
Bellamy would have endorsed. But it would be difficult to say that these 
aspects always triumphed, and more difficult yet to say that they triumphed 
in an environment in which human contentiousness had been put to rest, as 
Bellamy foresaw could happen by the end of the twentieth century. 
To the contrary, the civil rights legislation that today seems a critical 
watershed development on the road toward equality was won only by hard-
nosed legislative maneuvering by Lyndon Johnson, one of the greatest 
maneuverers of them all.20 To a large extent, however, breakthroughs came 
 
17 Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and Administra-
tion in Postwar America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 415, 416 (2008). 
18 Professor Chaves recognized that public law litigation was not the only sort of litigation 
that fit his new model: 
School desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners’ or inmates’ rights 
cases come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of litigation. But it would be 
mistaken to suppose that it is confined to these areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and 
other aspects of the conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, 
union governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportion-
ment, environmental management—cases in all these fields display in varying degrees 
the features of public law litigation. 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976). 
19 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 30 (1979) (urging that using public courts for mere dispute resolution is “an extravagant 
use of public resources”). 
20 It is a given that hard political fighting attended enactment of civil rights legislation in the 
1950s and 1960s. For a discussion of the legislative horse-trading that led to primary reliance on 
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in court, not in legislative halls. Brown v. Board of Education is the most 
famous of many court victories, but only one of many. 
Whether the framers should have foreseen this role for litigation is  
uncertain. By 1949, the problem of “protracted litigation” had prompted the 
Judicial Conference to appoint a committee to study these resulting prob-
lems of judicial administration.21 When Professor Chayes announced in 1976 
that “[w]e are witnessing the emergence of a new model of civil litigation” 
because “the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or 
statutory policies,” 22  Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell responded that 
similar litigation had been around for a long time.23 But as Professor Kagan 
has chronicled repeatedly,24 America is unique in the world in turning to its 
independent judiciary to make decisions about public policy. One might 
ascribe this development to failures of the more political branches of 
government, but it surely has contributed to charges of “judicial imperialism.” 
As the recent fiftieth anniversary of the March on Washington reminds 
us, there is more to be done to achieve the ideals we espouse. But it is 
considerably more difficult to say that this “Eyes on the Prize” sort of 
litigation looms large in the twenty-first century. The California prison 
litigation is a notable example of the continuing power of this form of 
litigation.25 But that example is an exception; “structural” litigation has 
largely disappeared from our courtrooms and from the headlines. In part, 
one may ascribe the decline of blockbuster litigation to more “careful” or 
“restrictive” attitudes towards class certification embodied in the Supreme 
 
private litigation rather than agency action to enforce Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see 
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 94-128 (2010). For discussion of the political fights that accompanied 
enactment of the rather toothless 1957 civil rights legislation, see generally ROBERT A. CARO, 
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE, 895-989 (2002). For 
additional discussion on these issues, see, for example, TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: 
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–65 (1998); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE 
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
21 The resulting report, the Prettyman Report, supra note 16, was published in 1951. 
22 Chayes, supra note 18, at 1282, 1284. 
23 Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institu-
tional Reform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
24 See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 
(2001). 
25 See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). Professor Issacharoff has labeled this 
case “the most significant class action litigation of the past decade.” Samuel Issacharoff, Class 
Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 375 (2012). 
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Court’s recent Wal-Mart26 and Comcast27 decisions. These cases highlight the 
ongoing difficulty of fitting aggregation within our adversarial litigation 
structure.28 
To a considerable degree, however, it may also be that society has moved 
beyond the structural injunction model. What we are told is the “new” civil 
rights history has as its chief characteristics “decentering the Supreme 
Court, Brown v. Board of Education, and the NAACP’s campaign for school 
desegregation.”29 One need not claim that we have achieved a “color blind” 
society to expect that discrimination litigation will increasingly depend on 
individual lawsuits for individual relief instead of mega-lawsuits for mega-relief. 
As Professor Farhang recognizes in the first sentence of his path-breaking 
book, The Litigation State, employment discrimination lawsuits are the 
largest category of civil actions in the federal courts after prisoner petitions.30 
Those thousands of cases are overwhelmingly individual suits, rather than 
massive class actions. For American litigation, this trend seems to be the 
wave of the present, and perhaps also the future. That is not to say litigation 
today is not heroic, but it is not heroic on a scale comparable to the heroic 
era. 
B. The Private Attorney General Model 
The civil rights litigator has been displaced by a new hero (or villain, 
according to one’s view)—the private attorney general. As Professor 
Rubenstein has chronicled, the expression “private attorney general” first 
appeared only after the Federal Rules went into effect,31 so it seems unlikely 
 
26 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (overturning certification of a 
class of more than one million present and former female employees of Wal-Mart asserting claims 
of endemic gender discrimination). 
27 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (overturning certification of a class 
of cable television subscribers in an antitrust case). 
28 For discussion, see generally Richard Marcus, Still Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 557 (2012) (exploring enduring tensions of aggregating claims). 
29 Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 
2320 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2013)). 
30 FARHANG, supra note 20, at 3. 
31 William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130 n.2 (2004) (citing the Supreme Court’s first use of the term in a 1943 
dissent, and “Judge Jerome Frank’s original use of the phrase in a Second Circuit decision 
[Associate Industries of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943)] rendered several months 
earlier”). 
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that the framers could have foreseen this idea—although qui tam and other 
devices offered analogies.32 
But the original idea of a private attorney general has certainly spread, 
perhaps partly as a result of a legislative compromise that looks different in 
retrospect than it did at the time and explains why a civil rights suit today is 
more likely to be an individual action than a class action. As Professor 
Farhang has detailed, debates in the Senate over enforcement of Title VII 
held up the passage of that anti-discrimination legislation in 1964.33 Liberal 
proponents of the bill wanted the chief enforcer to be the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but they needed Republican votes to 
pass the legislation. The Republicans, in turn, were extremely worried that 
the EEOC would resemble the National Labor Relations Board, which the 
business community viewed as siding almost reflexively with unions. 
Similarly zealous pro-employee action by the EEOC was anathema to them. 
So the Republicans insisted on making private suits by employees the chief 
method of enforcement.34 The liberal proponents of the bill were reluctant 
to permit this shift, but eventually had no choice. 
The liberals changed their minds about the private enforcement model 
rather quickly, and installed it in a wide variety of new legislation during 
the 1960s and 1970s. To measure the importance of the private attorney 
general idea, Professor Rubenstein used Westlaw references to the private 
attorney concept, finding a huge increase starting in the 1970s. This was not 
because of the “heroic” litigation described above: “the phrase explodes in 
the 1970s not because of public law litigation but because it takes root in 
new attorneys’ fees statutes and doctrines. Once loosed as a matter of 
money, the private attorney general concept’s diffusion was limited only by 
the imagination of lawyers seeking attorneys’ fees.”35 But the courts were 
not authorized to provide this incentive on their own. In 1975, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “Congress has opted to rely heavily on private 
enforcement to implement public policy” while holding that federal judges 
had no authority to award attorneys’ fees in the absence of a statutory 
provision for them.36 Congress responded swiftly with the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.37 
 
32 See id. at 2134 n.26 (citing ways in which private citizens assisted in the enforcement of 
criminal laws throughout American history). 
33 See FARHANG, supra note 20, at 94-128. 
34 Id. 
35 Rubenstein, supra note 31, at 2136. 
36 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
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The statutory model that fuels this activity often includes minimum 
recoveries as well as attorneys’ fee awards to prompt private enforcement. 
The setup can magnify both fees and enforcement impact when litigation is 
packaged as a class action. A recent example involves theft of a computer 
from a medical office in California. Because the computer had records of 
four million patients on its hard drive and California’s Confidentiality of 
Medical Information Act provides nominal damages of $1,000 per individual 
for negligently released data, the theft could lead to a $4 billion liability.38 
Legislators who offer the inducement of a minimum recovery probably do 
not think about the class action wrinkle. That surely seems to have been the 
case with the federal Truth in Lending Act; Congress eventually cabined 
class action exposure under that statute.39 Efforts to use class actions under 
similar statues have met a mixed reception in the courts.40 
 
38 See Scott Graham, Court to Weigh Price Tag for Data Breach, RECORDER, Jan. 28, 2013, at 1 
(describing this litigation). 
39 See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012)) (setting a ceiling of $100,000 or 1% of creditor’s 
net worth for awards in class actions). The maximum amount was later raised to $500,000. See 
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 257, 260 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012)). 
40 Recent class actions asserting failure to comply with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act (FACTA) requirement that a retailer block all but the last four digits of a credit card 
number illustrate the potential magnitude of damage awards in class actions involving a statutory 
minimum recovery. In Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010), the 
court reversed a district judge who ruled that a class action would not be “superior” within the 
meaning of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because the defendant acted in good faith and should not 
face a liability of between $29 million and $290 million. Id. at 710, 723-24. 
Notwithstanding this appellate directive, in Rowden v. Pacific Parking Systems, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 
581 (C.D. Cal. 2012), a district judge in the Ninth Circuit refused to certify a class action in a 
FACTA suit, citing congressional history describing hundreds of suits filed charging technical 
violations. Id. at 583-84. Plaintiff claimed that the municipal parking lot operator violated FACTA 
because parking receipts included the expiration date of credit cards—information that should not 
have appeared on tickets. Id. at 582-83. Judge Carney reasoned:  
Mr. Martin seeks $15 million from a small municipality for its alleged FACTA  
violations. Nobody in Mr. Martin’s proposed class, however, has ever experienced any 
of the harm for which FACTA was enacted to protect against. Moreover, after learning 
of the possible FACTA violations, Laguna Beach eventually took corrective measures. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Laguna Beach acted maliciously or in bad faith.  
Nevertheless, Mr. Martin demands that Laguna Beach defend itself in a time-consuming 
and expensive class action. But to do so could severely limit Laguna Beach’s ability to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the city. 
Laguna Beach does not have unlimited resources to participate in contentious 
class discovery, extensive law and motion, and a prolonged trial. Nor does Laguna 
Beach have the financial wherewithal to satisfy and survive an adverse $15 million 
judgment. Indeed, $15 million is twice the balance of Laguna Beach’s general fund reserves 
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More generally, the bloom has come somewhat off the rose for this form 
of litigation as well, even though the litigation remains commonplace. 
Trying to determine whether it is effective in achieving enforcement goals is 
beyond the scope of this paper; as Professor Lemos has written, there is a 
“vast literature” on the choice between public and private enforcement.41 As 
she has written more recently, the public enforcement alternative raises 
some serious questions.42 Meanwhile, others have launched attacks on the 
use of the class action as a method of enforcing public norms,43 prompting 
Professor Redish to characterize this attorney activity as “capitalistic 
socialism.”44 
There may be a division on the Supreme Court about whether to foster 
or neuter this form of litigation. The Court’s starting point, of course, was 
implying private causes of action when Congress did not itself authorize 
them, most famously in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, which held that private parties 
could sue for losses caused by violations of the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45 By the 1970s, the Court had become 
more circumspect about implying private causes of action,46 but it had not 
 
and more than this year’s entire budget for the city’s police department. Satisfying a 
$15 million judgment will compromise Laguna Beach’s ability to respond to emergen-
cies and provide necessary public services. In particular, the areas affected will include 
payment of workers’ compensation and employee medical insurance claims, response 
to natural disasters, and the provision of vital municipal services. The Court is at a 
loss to understand how Mr. Martin can seriously suggest that it is ‘fair’ to subject La-
guna Beach to such burdensome class litigation and expose the city to such ruinous li-
ability.  
Id. at 587 (footnotes and citations omitted). The judge distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Bateman (described above) as involving a “billion-dollar movie theater company [that] . . . print[ed] 
receipts displaying eight digits of consumers’ credit card numbers.” Id. at 587-88 n.9.  
It is perhaps not surprising to find judges resisting such draconian results. 
41 See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782 n.1 
(2011). 
42 See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) (exploring the various possible difficulties with relying on 
attorneys general to enforce public norms rather than leaving the task to private litigants). 
43 See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1441 (2005) (arguing that state attorneys general are preferable enforcers 
because they are not responding to profit motive and are subject to constraints that do not affect 
private attorneys pursuing fee awards). 
44 See Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of 
Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
45 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). 
46 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81-85 (1975) (limiting implied private causes of action to 
statutes that contain indicia that Congress intended to authorize such claims, and inclining against 
such an inference if such a claim would traditionally be relegated to state law). 
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necessarily retreated from its prior commitments. Thus, although Congress 
seemed perturbed by use of the private right to sue when it adopted the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995,47 the Court still 
thought the message of Borak was crucial when it interpreted the strict 
pleading requirements of PSLRA in 2007. Justice Ginsburg began the 
Court’s 2007 opinion in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. by observ-
ing that “[t]his Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions 
to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to 
criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, 
by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.”48 One might regard PSLRA as something of a rebuke to the Court 
for creating the problem and think it a bit cheeky for the Court to treat its 
preferences as the starting point in interpreting what Congress imposed on 
its creation. 
If Tellabs suggests that the private enforcement attitude remains alive 
and well in the Court, the 2013 decision in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant49 veers the other way. That case involved a suit under the 
Clayton Antitrust Act, which explicitly authorizes private suits and sweetens 
the pot in such actions by offering treble damages.50 Yet the Court enforced 
a class action waiver provision despite seemingly undisputed evidence that 
developing the expert analysis necessary to support the antitrust claim 
would cost more than $1 million while the individual plaintiff ’s claim was 
(even after trebling) $40,000, so a class action would be the only economi-
cally feasible method of suing.51 The 5–4 majority noted that class actions 
did not exist as an enforcement tool when the Clayton Act was passed more 
than a century before—and in any event was not concerned about nullifying 
private enforcement: 
[T]he antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the 
vindication of every claim. Congress has taken some measures to facilitate 
the litigation of antitrust claims—for example, it enacted a multiplied-
damages remedy. In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is 
 
47 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). Among other things, this legislation 
imposed strict pleading standards and a discovery stay pending ruling on a motion to dismiss in 
securities fraud litigation. 
48 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
49 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
50 Id. at 2309; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
51 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308, 2310. 
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willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing 
its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice.52 
The dissenters, speaking through Justice Kagan, emphasized that private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws is designed “not solely to compensate 
individuals but to promote ‘the public interest in vigilant enforcement of 
the antitrust laws.’”53 The majority’s attitude toward the crippling effect its 
ruling could have on effective enforcement, she said, was “admirably 
flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.”54 
At least in the federal courts, then, the growth era for private attorney 
general activity may be over. 
C. Tort Litigation 
Tort litigation has always been with us. But since World War II it has 
changed, in significant measure due to academic influence and law and 
economics analysis that stresses “internalizing” costs. The thrust of modern 
products liability law is that tort litigation would prompt manufacturers to 
make their products safer. Certainly that is what plaintiffs’ lawyers claim 
they have done.55 If their claims to have changed would-be defendants’ 
behaviors are not persuasive, consider the frequent objection that various 
activities have been stopped because of fear of suits.56 At least at the level of 
claimed effects, then, there is a surprising agreement between the plaintiff-
side and defendant-side on bottom-line results; the disagreement is about 
whether this effect is desirable. 
At the same time, the tort model has grown beyond traditional automobile 
tort and similar personal injury claims. A proliferation of new tort-like 
claims provides both compensation and deterrence. Suits for workplace 
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, bad faith refusals to 
settle by insurance companies, and the like bespeak the growing importance 
of tort claims. Whether these should be considered “public interest” claims 
 
52 Id. at 2309 (citation omitted). 
53 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 
322, 329 (1955)). 
54 Id. 
55 For an illustration, see AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGA-
TION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS (2010), available at http://www.justice.org/cps/ 
rde/xbcr/justice/Driven_to_Safety.pdf (reporting the views of a leading plaintiffs’ attorneys 
group). 
56 These claims are so common that citations are hardly necessary. 
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akin to those sketched in the previous sections can be debated.57 Whether 
one classes consumer deception claims in this same category could also be 
debated,58 but some private claims authorized by statute seem to blend into 
tort claims. Consider, for example, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,59 in 
which plaintiffs asserted a collection of cutting-edge tort theories against 
the tobacco industry. The court held that these newly minted claims could 
not provide the basis for a massive class action,60 but the effort illustrates 
the range of tort litigation innovation that might serve to achieve “public 
law” results.61 
D. The New World of Corporate Litigation 
“Next to war, commercial litigation is the largest item of preventable loss in  
civilization.”  
–Herbert Hoover62 
President Hoover63 was echoing a recurrent theme of pre–World War II 
corporate America—business corporations did not sue business corporations. 
One consequence of this pervasive attitude was that litigation departments 
were poor step children in major law firms. The “real” lawyers were the 
corporate lawyers; the litigators were invited in only when necessary to 
defend against outsiders such as shareholders, people claiming injury due to 
the company’s products, or the government. 
Two decades ago Dean Garth described the remarkable change in corpo-
rate attitudes toward litigation. By the 1980s, corporate clients began to 
shop for lawyers, producing competition among law firms to land corporate 
 
57 See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L.  
REFORM 647, 671-75 (1988) (exploring the question of whether tort litigation could be seen as 
public law litigation). 
58 See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that claims under the New York Consumer Protection Act alleging that defendant falsely 
claimed that its food products were part of a healthy diet were not claims of “fraud” within FED. 
R. CIV. P. 9(b)). 
59 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
60 Id. at 752.  
61 In somewhat the same vein, consider Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 5 (Scalia, 
Circuit Justice 2010), in which Justice Scalia granted a stay against enforcement of a Louisiana 
state court class action judgment against the tobacco companies. 
62 INST. OF LAW: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., SURVEY OF CIVIL JUSTICE IN NEW 
YORK 1 (1931).  
63 Hoover was Secretary of Commerce at the time he made this statement.  
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litigation business. Meanwhile: 
[T]he business world’s increased competitiveness made businesses eager to 
take advantage of whatever was available for economic warfare, including 
the law . . . . 
 Business litigation increased, and there was competition within business 
litigation. The principal forms of innovation in litigation, it appears, were 
methods that escalated legal conflicts. Every aspect of lawsuits became  
contested.64 
Some attributed this development to the declining ability of lawyers to 
dissuade their clients from pursuing litigation—or at least to dissuade them 
from pursuing it in a scorched earth manner.65 
Five years later Dean Garth elaborated on the relationship between this 
development and the escalating discovery problems reported in some cases: 
[L]awyers in the ordinary cases have learned how to manage time and  
expense. They have had to do so, since their clients will not pay for 
scorched earth tactics. On the other hand, the high-stakes, high-conflict 
cases involve clients who pay for the services of lawyers as warriors, and 
that is what they usually get. In terms of the legal services market and the 
civil discovery problem, it appears that clients seek the elite of the bar only 
when they believe that the nature of the problem and the stakes are suffi-
ciently high to justify a major investment in legal services (or, in the con-
tingent fee area, are sufficient for the lawyer to invest substantially in the 
case). It is likely that only a fraction of lawyers can claim the fees or attract 
the cases that justify (in terms of the stakes) investment in litigation as full-
scale warfare . . . .66 
The current marketing vogue for “bet the company” lawyers confirms 
that these forces are still at work. Sometimes the litigations involved fit into 
the prior categories, involving mass tort or toxic tort claims (particularly 
multidistrict litigation), private enforcement of public norms (as in securities 
 
64 Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession 
and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 942 (1993). 
65 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 
MD. L. REV. 869, 899-903 (1990); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: 
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 290 (1993) (lamenting the declining ability of 
lawyers to influence or guide their clients in making business decisions, as opposed to facilitating 
decisions the clients made without lawyer guidance). 
66 Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets 
in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998). 
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fraud litigation), or twenty-first century ideological litigation like the 
Ecuador cleanup suit involving Chevron Corporation.67 
Increasingly, however, they represent a new model of business-to-
business litigation, a situation that sometimes prompts considerable critical 
attention. A prime recent example is the concern with “patent troll” litiga-
tion, exhibiting characteristics typical of the more general criticism of 
litigation. In June 2013, the White House reacted to this development with 
a report entitled Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation,68  concerning the 
potential impact of suits by “patent assertion entities,” or nonpracticing 
holders of patents, which increased 250% in two years and now account for 
nearly two-thirds of all patent infringement suits.69  
Other developments suggest the magnitude of this trend. In January 
2012, The Wall Street Journal reported that prominent Kirkland & Ellis and 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges partners left their lucrative niches defending 
patent infringement suits and founded new firms to acquire patents and file 
patent infringement suits.70 The former Kirkland & Ellis partner said he 
was making “much more” at his new firm than he had at Kirkland. His move 
showed that, “by crossing over to plaintiffs work, a seasoned defense lawyer 
could get some skin in the game and nab a fortune unattainable in Big 
Law.”71 The former Weil partner reportedly left behind a $5 million per year 
draw to found his new venture.72 
Whether one should worry about this development is unclear and be-
yond the scope of this Essay. In June 2013, the Federal Trade Commission 
announced that it was planning an inquiry into frivolous patent lawsuits.73 
In July 2013, The New York Times ran a profile of the owner of a prominent 
patent infringement plaintiffs’ firm that had supposedly sued 1638 companies 
over the past five years.74 Although the story details some bare-knuckle 
tactics by its subject, Erich Spangenberg,75 it also offers an example of 
 
67 For those who have not heard of this litigation, a primer on its issues appears in the Stanford 
Journal of Complex Litigation, Symposium, Lessons from Chevron, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG., 195-
523 (2013). 
68 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
69 Id. at 5.  
70 Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become ‘Trolls,’ WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012, at B1. 
71 Julia Love, For Piece of the Action, Powers Need Patents, RECORDER, Aug. 26, 2013, at 11. 
72 Jones, supra note 70; see also Love, supra note 71 (reporting that the Weil partner may not 
be encountering quite as much success as the Kirkland & Ellis lawyer, who made his move earlier). 
73 Cf. Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2013, at B1. 
74 David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue., N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013 (Sunday Business), at 1. 
75 Id. (quoting Spangenberg as saying, “[o]nce you go thug, though, you can’t unthug”). 
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Spangenberg coming to the defense of a victim of a patent troll. The White 
House report recommended three methods for resolving the problem it 
identified, including “reduc[ing] disparity of litigation costs.”76 That may 
remind us of another observation by Dean Garth about scorched earth 
business litigation more generally: 
Lawyers c[an] make life very difficult for any opposing business by taking 
advantage of the open-ended nature of discovery under Federal Rule 26, 
proliferating depositions and requests for documents or fighting aggressively 
to resist such requests. Discovery practice in the 1970s became the key to 
the practice of corporate litigation.77 
III. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DISCOVERY 
Discovery was central to the original Federal Rules’ reform package. We 
are told repeatedly that it is also central to effective litigation reform78; 
hence the longstanding place discovery has had on the Advisory Committee’s 
agenda. One looking at the present and to the future must recognize that 
discovery has surely achieved many of the goals that the framers hoped it 
would achieve. Thus, in the 1960s, when scholars intensely studied the 
question of whether to relax the tethers on the discovery rules, the empirical 
research commissioned by the Advisory Committee showed that discovery 
did much good, but hardly solved all problems. Already conflict over scope 
had become a principal source of controversy.79 But other aspects of the 
1960s research may surprise contemporary observers. The chief objections 
then were to interrogatories, not document requests:80 “Interrogatories are 
the only device that causes the average recipient to work at least as hard as 
the sender. . . . [R]ecipients suspect that senders are shifting the burden 
to them, instead of doing the work of document inspection themselves.”81 
 
76 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 68, at 13. 
77 Garth, supra note 64, at 942. 
78 I base this statement on my seventeen years of service as Associate Reporter of the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules, focusing throughout that time on discovery rules. I am character-
izing what I have heard in that capacity and found in the Committee’s files. For developments 
before I took this position in 1996, see Richard Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 747 (1998) (detailing discovery reforms between 1976 and 1996). 
79 See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 161 
(1968) (“Disputes over scope may be inherent in the adversary system, since each side tries to 
define the subject matter in its own self-interested way.”). 
80 Id. at 149.  
81 Id. at 151-52. 
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But at that time depositions were “the central device in discovery,”82 and 
it appeared that defendants used discovery more frequently than did 
plaintiffs and gained more from it.83 The pro- and anti-discovery views were 
already well established, however. As the empirical study on which the 
rulemakers relied for their 1960s reforms described the situation then: “[t]he 
critics ‘know’ that discovery is abused generally and should be abolished. 
The admirers ‘know’ that discovery is unblemished by misuse. But facts 
sometimes confound all faiths.”84 As in the 1960s, more recent research 
generally confirms that discovery costs are relatively reasonable in much 
federal court litigation.85 
That 1960s insight led to the revision of the discovery rules effective in 
1970, the high water point for discovery liberality. Since then, the main 
impulse has been to contain and constrain discovery.86 In terms of the 
various kinds of litigation identified in Part II that the framers probably 
could not foresee, these changes address issues primarily related to three of 
the kinds of litigation—private attorney general suits, tort litigation, and 
corporate litigation. The first category—“impact” or “structural” litigation—
has generated far more ire about “imperial” federal judges than about 
discovery burdens. Indeed, it is not clear that most of the early impact 
litigation even depended much on discovery. Brown v. Board of Education 
introduced the notion of “legislative fact,”87 something that the Court could 
find through library research, not something depending on discovery in the 
case. 
More recently, the line between “impact” litigation (the first category) 
and private attorney litigation designed to enforce public norms more 
generally (the second category) has blurred. At least some cases seem to fit 
 
82 Id. at 52. 
83 Id. at 51, 83, 90. 
84 Id. at 117. 
85 See Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies 
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1102-16 (2012) (examining 1997 and 2009 Federal Judicial 
Center closed case studies). 
86 For a review of these developments through 1993, see generally Marcus, supra note 78. The 
2000 discovery amendments largely continued this trend, as did the proposals in the 2013 
Preliminary Draft, infra note 93. 
87 In 1942, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis introduced the idea of “legislative facts” to describe 
courts’ actions in engaging in semi-factual research that goes beyond the formal evidence 
contained in court records. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 407 (1942). That sort of activity became central to 
cases like Brown v. Board of Education. See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in 
Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966). 
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into both categories. For example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes88 was both 
a private employment discrimination case and an effort to have a very broad 
impact, perhaps to shift employment discrimination law. But the failure of 
the class certification effort in the Wal-Mart case was surely not a result of 
lack of discovery.89 To the contrary, the emerging abandonment of the idea 
that courts cannot evaluate merits issues in connection with class certification 
seems likely to open a door for plaintiff discovery in class actions that had, 
until recently, been shut. 90  So for the twenty-first century version of 
“impact” litigation, considerable discovery may be necessary early in the 
case.91 
Because the classic version of “impact” litigation has faded in importance, 
it is the other three types of litigation identified in Part II that probably 
constitute a major portion of the “problem” cases that prompt objections to 
broad discovery. As many have noted, careful research by the Federal 
Judicial Center Research Division in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries has shown that discovery does not seem to be a significant 
problem in “normal” litigation, probably of the sort the framers would have 
anticipated. Of course, the 1951 Prettyman Report’s focus on the burdens of 
massive evidentiary showings92 demonstrates that the calm did not long 
endure or at least that disruptive new forces soon intruded—although the 
stress in 1951 was not on discovery burdens borne by responding parties. 
Much of the response to concerns about overdiscovery has depended on 
numerical cutting back and judicial management. Both techniques continue 
to be important.93 But neither really qualifies as a breakthrough idea that 
 
88 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
89 Id. at 2561. No claim was made that plaintiffs were denied needed discovery. It seems they 
must have had quite a lot; their statistical expert “conducted his analysis region-by-region, 
comparing the number of women promoted into management positions with the percentage of 
women in the available pool of hourly workers.” Id. at 2555. That information must have come 
from discovery. 
90 See generally Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the 
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011) (tracing the increasing willing-
ness of lower courts to probe “merits” issues when deciding whether to certify a class). 
91 An example may be useful. In Beach v. Healthways, Inc., defendants had already produced 
1.7 million pages of documents and anticipated a total production of 6.8 million pages during pre-
certification discovery. 264 F.R.D. 360, 362 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). Pointing to this effort, 
defendants argued that, “if a class is ultimately not certified or if the class period were shortened, 
the defendants will have spent millions of dollars for naught.” Id. at 362. One doubts that the 
defendants would regard this effort as going “for naught” if it led to denial of class certification, 
though they would surely prefer to reach that result by a less costly route. 
92 See Prettyman Report, supra note 16. 
93 Thus, the package of proposed amendments published for public comment in August 2013 
included revisions of numerical limitations for interrogatories and depositions and introduction of 
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the framers might find distinctive. Judicial management surely was known 
to them: Rule 34 did not originally permit document requests without 
advance judicial approval, and Rule 35 examinations of a party still require 
judicial approval unless the parties stipulate.94 So it cannot be said that 
these recent adjustments move in a qualitatively distinctive direction. Of 
the variety of measures that have been introduced since 1970, I think that 
attention can most profitably focus on two—initial disclosure and propor-
tionality. 
A. Initial Disclosure 
Before the 1970s, clamor about overly burdensome discovery was not 
particularly prominent, and concerns about secrecy seemed more pressing. 
Certainly American lawyers’ penchant for adversarial maneuver and surprise 
at trial irked Roscoe Pound, who denounced it during his famous 1906 
speech.95 An abiding question is whether that penchant can be changed, and 
whether it should be changed. Curiously, in the very case in which it 
declared that the cherished cry of “fishing expedition”—used by those 
seeking to defeat discovery—could no longer hold sway, the Supreme Court 
simultaneously enshrined the work product doctrine as a basis for resisting 
discovery.96 At least some lawyerly secrets could be kept under wraps. 
From one perspective, this gamesmanship lies at the heart of most of the 
contemporary cavil about discovery. Repeatedly, the defense-side argument 
stresses the overbreadth of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, particularly Rule 
34 requests. The argument, understandably, is that it is expensive to have to 
find and turn over reams of material, and particularly galling when most of 
that material never reappears in the case (either as exhibits in depositions or 
 
numerical limits for requests for admissions. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 284-86 
(2013) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT] (proposing amending Rule 16 to 
reduce the time before a scheduling order is entered and adding preservation and orders under 
FED. R. EVID. 502 to the agenda for contents of a scheduling order); id. at 300 (proposing 
amending Rule 30 to reduce the number of depositions without leave of court from ten to five); id. 
at 305 (proposing amending Rule 33 to reduce the number of interrogatories from twenty-five to 
fifteen); id. at 310 (proposing amending Rule 36 to limit requests for admissions to twenty-five). 
Note that after the public comment period, some of these proposals were revised or withdrawn.  
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 35. 
95 Pound attacked “our American exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure,” 
including partisan witnesses and slashing but spurious cross-examination. See Pound, supra note 10, 
at 404-05. He also denounced “deciding cases on points of practice.” Id. at 408. 
96 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
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at trial or in connection with summary judgment motions). Understandably, 
one argument is that discovery should focus mainly on the much smaller 
number of items that will be used in that way in the case, even if it is not 
limited solely to those things.97 
It seems undeniable that much discovery yields more than the party 
seeking production really wants. To take a fifty-year old case as an illustration: 
in the MER/29 litigation in the early 1960s, plaintiffs’ lawyers in the 
consolidated discovery obtained sixty-five rolls of microfilm with more than 
100,000 documents for shared review. 98  Under counsel’s coordination 
agreements, this material was reviewed by a “trustee” who “spent virtually 
two summers reading and copying pertinent documents on the film, even 
then reading only half.”99 A decade later, in the Bendectin litigation, things 
seemed not to have changed a great deal because of the differences in 
resources between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendant Merrell: 
This difference in resources is graphically illustrated by the way in which 
one of the [individual plaintiff ’s] lawyers dealt with production of the 
lengthy new drug applications produced by Merrell: he rented a microfilm 
machine in Florida, loaded it in his car, drove to New York where Merrell’s 
lawyers had their office, and microfilmed the documents him-
self. . . . [T]ry as they did, plaintiffs’ lawyers in the individual suit “did 
not have the resources or capacity that Merrell did.” The formation of the 
plaintiffs’ litigation committee in connection with the multidistrict litiga-
tion “afforded plaintiffs’ lawyers a far more level playing field in terms of 
 
97 In that vein, consider the recent revision of the scope of discovery under MINN. R. CIV. 
P. 26.02(b), effective July 1, 2013 (new matter italicized; deleted matter overstricken): 
Discovery must be limited to matters that would enable a party to prove or disprove a claim 
or defense or to impeach a witness and must comport with the factors of proportionality, in-
cluding without limitation, the burden or expense of the proposed discovery weighed against its 
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ re-
sources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery 
in resolving the issues. Subject to these limitations, Pparties may obtain discovery regarding 
any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to a claim or defense of any party,  
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. Upon a showing of For good cause and 
proportionality, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject  
matter involved in the action. Relevant information sought need not be admissible at 
the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of  
admissible evidence. 
98 Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 116, 127-29 (1968). 
99 Id. at 130.  
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stakes and available resources,” and plaintiffs’ discovery in the multidistrict 
action was accordingly much broader than in the individual suit.100 
Although these rudimentary techniques and the relatively small volume 
may seem quaint, it is likely that the experience is repeated today—those 
who receive massive amounts of discovery may be overwhelmed by it. Even 
though the plaintiffs’ bar today seems much better organized and financed 
than it was in the 1960s through the 1980s, it surely can still be overwhelmed 
by production under Rule 34. Why, one might ask, don’t these lawyers limit 
their requests to what they really need and want? One answer sometimes 
suggested by the defense side is that the breadth of plaintiff requests is 
designed to defeat resolution of cases on their merits. In the new world of 
plaintiff networks created by the American Association for Justice and other 
organizations, the contention runs, the plaintiffs’ lawyers already have the 
documents they really need. What they are doing, we have been told, is 
trying to lay the groundwork for a sanctions motion when overwhelmed 
defendants fail to produce some of the documents that plaintiffs’ counsel 
already have, enabling them to seek a default judgment or other advantage 
for failure to produce.101 Thus overbroad discovery requests might be used 
to club the defendant into submission in two ways—by the sheer cost of 
compliance, and due to the additional fear that even a huge effort to comply 
will not prevent a sanction foreclosing defense on the merits. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers do not always respond to these arguments by claiming 
that they make narrow discovery requests. They do argue persuasively that 
because few of them are being paid by the hour, they have no incentive to 
generate more work for their side. They might say that the fact they do not 
even review everything they get is simply a sign that they are engaged in 
sensible triage. And even though some of them acknowledge that the 
plaintiffs’ bar is much better organized and financed than it was in the 1960s 
and 1970s, they emphasize that defense counsel nevertheless routinely 
outguns them. 
The basic problem, plaintiffs’ lawyers say, is that narrow requests will 
not produce the needed information; they must request lots of chaff to make 
certain they get the wheat. For one thing, they cannot request that defendant 
produce “the 100 documents that best show that defendant should be found 
 
100 Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 243-
44 (1997) (citations omitted) (reviewing and quoting MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND 
BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996)). 
101 I distinctly remember defense-side lawyers making this argument during the Advisory 
Committee’s September 1997 conference on discovery. 
  
2014] “Looking Backward” to 1938 1713 
 
liable.” That simply is not a request that would satisfy Rule 34’s particularity 
requirement.102 Moreover, it seems to intrude precisely into opinion work 
product, the most sacrosanct precinct.103 How could one side require the 
other side’s lawyer to reveal judgments about which documents would be 
most damning? Certainly that is a topic on defense counsel’s mind during 
trial preparation, but it is also precisely the sort of insight that the protec-
tion of opinion work product is designed to keep secret. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
would not be receptive to reciprocal discovery requests that may reveal the 
holes in their cases. 
So from the plaintiffs’ point of view, what is necessary is to cast a wide 
net and try as best as possible to identify in the mass of discovered infor-
mation the things that one cannot ask defense counsel to cull for the 
plaintiffs—the triage referred to above. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel 
emphatically argue that too many defense counsel engage in games of their 
own, holding back “hot” documents on spurious grounds,104 sending up a 
smoke screen of distracting objections, or over-producing to magnify the 
chore for plaintiffs’ counsel who are trying to find the relatively few really 
important documents in the mass of marginally relevant or totally irrelevant 
documents. This is not a good state of affairs, the plaintiffs’ side says, but it 
is better than not getting what you need at all. As Judge Facciola has noted, 
“like the Rolling Stones, [plaintiffs’ counsel] hope that if they ask for what 
they want, they will get what they need. They hardly need any more encour-
agement to demand as much as they can from their opponent.”105 
In short, we seem to have reached an impasse. The plaintiff-side argu-
ments that defense counsel engage in their own discovery games seems 
sufficient to warrant a response of some sort.106 At the same time, it is hard 
 
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (mandating that a request “describe with reasonable particu-
larity each item or category of items to be inspected”). 
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (directing the court to “protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney” even where it 
finds that production of work product is warranted). 
104 Such spurious grounds might include exploiting the other side’s use of narrowly tailored 
requests to support the argument that the bombshell document was not requested. 
105 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
106 On this score, note that the pending package of amendment proposals includes proposed 
amendments to address such behavior. See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 
93, at 307-08 (amending Rule 34 to require that responding parties “state the grounds for objecting 
to the request with specificity” and also “state whether any responsive materials are being withheld 
on the basis of that objection”). 
At least some judges appear receptive to ending such avoidance games. Consider Silicon 
Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.C. 2012), where the judge exhibited  
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to believe that either side is entirely innocent of the sort of behavior 
charged by the other side. Has it never happened that a plaintiff ’s lawyer 
designed a discovery demand partly to impose burdens on defendant, or 
that a defense lawyer adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of a discovery 
request to excuse turning over damaging information? But one might hope 
for a method better tailored to avoid the game-playing by both plaintiff and 
defense lawyers. 
In the early 1990s, the Advisory Committee tried to find such a method, 
and it hit upon initial disclosure. To some extent, this general idea may have 
mirrored the United Kingdom’s system of “disclosure,” which relies on 
counsel to be relatively forthcoming. Indeed, in the wake of the Lord Woolf 
reforms to U.K. procedure in the late 1990s, there are now “pre-action 
protocols” that “encourage the exchange of early and full information about 
the prospective legal claim.”107 Congress itself had chimed in with the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990, which encouraged individual districts to adopt 
“principles” including “encouragement of cost-effective discovery through 
voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their attorneys and 
through the use of cooperative discovery devices.”108 Judge Schwarzer, a 
leader in litigation reform, had urged similar principles in a 1989 paper.109 
Thinking along the same lines, the Advisory Committee published a 
1991 proposed amendment adding a requirement of initial disclosure, 
without the need for a formal discovery request, regarding any person likely 
 
 
little tolerance for plaintiff ’s avoidance gaming, reacting: 
In addition to boilerplate objections, Silicon Knights also added specious re-
sponses to some discovery requests. For example, in response to Epic Games’s 
eighth and ninth requests for production, Silicon Knights stated that, “[s]ubject to 
and without waiving any of [its] objections . . . , [Silicon Knights] will endeavor to 
identify and produce appropriately responsive documents.”. . . This vague, open-
ended response merely “state[s] an intention to make some production at an un-
specified date of [Silicon Knights’s] own choosing [and] is not a complete answer as 
required by Rule 34(b) and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(3) is treated as a fail-
ure to answer or respond.” 
Id. at 533-34 (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 
226, 247 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (citations omitted)). 
107 See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-8 (2003) (describing the new approach, and noting that the pre-action 
protocols operate in the shadow of “the Damoclean sword of costs and other sanctions”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
108 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (2006). 
109 See William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721-23 (1989) (proposing adoption of a rule requiring disclosure of all 
relevant information without the need for a formal discovery request). 
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to have “information that bears significantly on any claim or defense” and a 
description of any documents “likely to bear significantly on any claim or 
defense.”110 That proposal may seem innocuous—at least when compared 
with the supposedly immense burdens of contemporary discovery—but it 
was received with great alarm by both sides of the bar.111 The Advisory 
Committee retreated and decided to limit the disclosure requirement to 
information and documents “relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings,” seemingly encouraging more informative pleading.112 
Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas denounced that more limited proposal 
because it did “not replace the current, much-criticized discovery process; 
rather, it add[ed] a further layer of discovery.”113 Worse yet, they thought, it 
threatened to undermine the entire fabric of American litigation ethics: 
By placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to 
their clients—on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines be-
tween what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are not clear 
but require the exercise of considerable judgment—the new Rule would 
place intolerable strain upon lawyers’ ethical duty to represent their clients 
and not to assist the opposing side.114 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the amendment went into effect—but 
only because one senator refused to waive the Senate’s rules and the bill 
striking initial disclosure from the package therefore failed to pass.115 And 
the amended rule permitted district courts to secede from initial disclosure 
by local rule, which many did, producing a patchwork practice across the 
federal judicial system that the Federal Judicial Center attempted to monitor 
on an annual basis.116 To restore national uniformity, the initial disclosure 
rule was revised in 2000 to make it apply nationwide but only to witnesses 
or documents that the disclosing party may use to support its case; each side 
 
110 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-88 (1991). 
111 See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 808-09 (1993) (describing tumult). 
112 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-32 (1993). 
113 Id. at 510. 
114 Id. at 511. 
115 See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Aponovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rule-
making: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
461, 485 (1997) (describing how one senator’s refusal to consent to suspending the rules prevented 
legislation that would have removed initial disclosure from the 1993 rule amendment package). 
116 See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE 
IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS’ 
RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1998) 
(describing and categorizing local regimes of initial disclosure). 
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would still need conventional discovery to obtain material helpful to its 
case.117 
This is not a happy history. True, the broadest of disclosure regimes may 
ask lawyers to do something that genuinely conflicts with their ingrained 
instincts.118 But unless something like this can break the impasse, it may be 
that moderate refinements seem safer than dramatic changes. On the 
moderate refinement front, the recent development of disclosure protocols 
for individual employment discrimination litigation119 may pave the way 
toward workable solutions, but more work will need to be done before those 
solutions exist in most cases. 
B. Proportionality 
In 1961, when it published its massive Developments in the Law—
Discovery, the Harvard Law Review noted at the outset that “[e]ven when 
invoked sparingly, discovery may impose upon both parties and nonparties 
burdens of cost and inconvenience that are disproportionate to the signifi-
 
117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
118 Consider the following “letter” to a client that an Arizona lawyer offered as a parody of 
what state court disclosure rules there would require: 
[W]e should schedule a meeting at the earliest possible opportunity, at which time 
you should be prepared to provide an outline, which I will immediately provide to 
plaintiff ’s attorney, of all facts which tend to support the claims for relief the plaintiff 
has set forth in the complaint.  
 [I]f the plaintiff has failed to pursue any appropriate claims against your compa-
ny, we should also gather and pass on to plaintiff ’s counsel all facts which he would 
want to know that he might amend his claim to pursue any additional theories of re-
lief against your company. 
Robert J. Bruno, The Disclosure Rule Is a Mistake, MARICOPA LAW., Aug. 1992, at 6. A plaintiff ’s 
lawyer responded that it was “ridiculous” and that “such efforts were so clearly silly that no 
reasonable advocate would expect a defense lawyer to engage in them.” JoJene Mills, Practical 
Implications of the Zlaket Rules from a Plaintiff ’s Lawyer’s Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 149, 163 (1993). 
119 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PRO-
TOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION 2 (2011). As described in 
the introduction: 
The Protocols create a new category of information exchange, replacing initial  
disclosures with initial discovery specific to employment cases alleging adverse  
action. This discovery is provided automatically by both sides within 30 days of the 
defendant’s responsive pleading or motion. While the parties’ subsequent right to 
discovery under the F.R.C.P. is not affected, the amount and type of information  
initially exchanged ought to focus the disputed issues, streamline the discovery process, 
and minimize opportunities for gamesmanship. 
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cance of the litigation to those who must bear such burdens.”120 Twenty 
years later, Professor Arthur Miller, then Reporter of the Advisory Committee, 
“perceive[d] the need for imposing some restraint on cumulative and 
excessive discovery.”121 This was the prompt for the proportionality provi-
sions installed in the discovery rules in 1983. At the time, Professor Miller 
announced that these changes heralded a “180-degree shift” in federal 
discovery.122 
In all likelihood, Professor Miller was premature in that announcement. 
When I prepared the second edition of the Federal Practice & Procedure 
volumes addressing discovery a decade later, I added a new section dealing 
with proportionality, but had to report that “[t]he [proportionality] 
amendment itself seems to have created only a ripple in the case law.”123 But 
by the time the third edition appeared in 2010, things had changed, and I 
could report that the “attention to the proportionality provisions has grown 
since 1994, and endorsement of their use has widened.”124 
In part, this expansion of attention to proportionality can be traced to 
rule changes. In 2000, a cross-reference to the proportionality provisions 
was added to Rule 26(b)(1), the basic rule on scope of discovery.125 The 2013 
proposed amendments relocate that proportionality in Rule 26(b)(1), 
elevating it more directly into the basic definition of the scope of discovery.126 
If this change is adopted, the existing trend to emphasize proportionality 
may accelerate. 
Perhaps more basically, there is great appeal to the concept of propor-
tionality. But that does not mean that it is easy for judges to apply. For one 
thing, the “value” of a case is uncertain, particularly at the outset. Although 
we recognize that the monetary amount claimed by the plaintiffs suffices to 
 
120  Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942 (1961). 
121 Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaning ful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 354 (2013). 
122 ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGE-
MENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32-33 (1984). 
123 8 CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994). 
124 8 CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2010). 
125 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).”). 
126 See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 289-90. 
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satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction,127 
the relaxed standard seems manifestly insufficient for determining whether 
highly burdensome or costly discovery is warranted.  
The “value” of proposed discovery also may be debated. Although econ-
omists may urge that any discovery foray that does not promise to provide 
more “value” in evidence than it would cost the other side to provide be 
regarded as “abusive,”128 that determination is often elusive. Until discovery 
is done, it is surely difficult to predict with confidence what it will produce, 
and results might depend in some cases on whether the responding party 
actually complies with its discovery obligations. The question whether 
“overbroad” requests are necessary to procure the essential information 
remains salient. Moreover, measuring the prospective benefit against the 
cost requires some confidence about what those costs will be; it may be that 
the responding party has a strong incentive to magnify those costs in hopes 
of making the entire exercise unnecessary. So many mechanical obstacles lie 
in the way of actual proportionality decisions. 
Beyond these difficulties, there may be value judgments that complicate 
the calculus. The rule acknowledges that one of the things the court should 
focus on is “the importance of the issues at stake in the action.”129 Perhaps 
in a case like Brown v. Board of Education, that is easy to take into account; 
had extensive discovery been needed (as seems not to have been the case), 
one would have a strong argument that the sky should be the limit. In other 
cases, things may not be so easy, as Professor Sherman pointed out when 
proportionality was first added to the rules: 
What values should be used in deciding whether, for example, the plaintiff 
in a $10,000 personal injury case should be limited in the number of deposi-
tions he may take, or the plaintiff seeking reinstatement in an employment 
discrimination case should be prohibited from discovering documents only 
tangentially related to the claim, or the defendant in a $10,000,000 product 
liability case should be allowed to require answers to voluminous interroga-
tories involving the most searching details of plaintiff ’s past life?130 
 
127 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938) (holding that, 
for purposes of satisfying the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the court 
must accept plaintiff ’s claim for more than that amount so long as it is made in “good faith”). 
128 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 61, 61 (1995) (urging such an approach). 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
130 Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80’s—Making 
the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 276 (1982). 
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Some may recoil at the notion that a dollar value provides meaningful 
guidance about the pursuit of justice. As Judge Learned Hand famously 
intoned, “Thou shalt not ration justice.”131 But surely that aspiration must 
be limited, at least with regard to wide-ranging discovery, by the possibility 
that litigation expense may itself frustrate or prevent justice. Even litigators 
should concede that it would not be sensible for all of society’s assets to be 
consumed by the transaction costs of litigation. 
A tricky but central problem is to determine when discovery that seems 
“reasonable” in terms of providing needed evidence is nonetheless too costly 
or burdensome given the small stakes involved. As noted above, it must be 
true that plaintiffs’ lawyers make such calculations every time they decide 
whether to take on a contingent-fee case, asking whether the prospective 
recovery justifies the cost and effort of pursuing it in court. Part of that 
expense will be the cost of discovery; in 1997, the Federal Judicial Center’s 
research study suggested that discovery actually often costs plaintiffs more 
than defendants.132 For decades, however, litigants seeking discovery have 
invoked Rule 26(b)(1)’s seeming invitation to do any discovery “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and argued that 
what they wanted was so calculated.133 Actually, that phrase was not included 
in the rule to support this sort of argument, and the current amendment 
package proposes removing it to eliminate this confusion.134 
The question may remain, however: should proportionality concerns 
prevent discovery that is “reasonable” in terms of producing admissible 
evidence? The English experience provides an analogy that may be instruc-
tive. In the U.K., of course, the full indemnity principle has prevailed for 
 
131 Judge Hand made this statement in his seventy-fifth anniversary address to the Legal Aid 
Society of New York on February 16, 1951. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise 
by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421 
(2012) (quoting Judge Hand). 
132 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under 
the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 tbl.3 (1998) (showing that at the 95th 
percentile, the discovery cost for plaintiffs was one-third higher than for defendants). A recent 
illustration comes from Timothy McDonald, Alternative Approaches in Responding to Medical Errors, 
TRIAL, May 2013, at 34, an article for plaintiffs’ lawyers who sue for medical malpractice. Written, 
it seems, from the perspective of a hospital, the article endorses a more forthcoming approach 
from hospitals. In service to that goal, it also appears to use discovery costs as a reason for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to tread softly: “Once the patient obtains counsel, defense attorneys will deny 
and defend any and all allegations against their client. This often results in a protracted discovery 
process over many years where the defense employs legal maneuvers to keep information away 
from the patient, family, and their counsel.” Id. at 36. 
133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
134 See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 289-90. 
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centuries—the winning litigant gets to recover its costs of suit, including 
attorneys’ fees, from the loser. Although that indemnity principle was 
hedged a bit by the idea that only “reasonable” expenditures on litigation 
could be charged to the other side, indemnity still ruled the day in most 
instances. But Lord Woolf ’s revisions to U.K. practice installed proportionality 
as a central concern in the late 1990s.135 
The question shortly arose whether disproportionate expenditures on 
litigation could be recovered from the other side if they were reasonably 
calculated to assist in winning the case. Speaking for the court, Lord Woolf 
himself explained in 2002 that the standard should be “necessity,” adding 
that “the threshold required to meet necessity is higher than that of reason-
ableness.”136 
Despite the centrality of proportionality to Lord Woolf ’s reforms, the 
problem of excessive costs did not go away, and in 2009, Lord Justice 
Jackson was assigned the task of studying ways to improve the handling of 
costs. Declaring that the effect of Lord Woolf ’s test “was to insert the 
Victorian test of necessity into the modern concept of proportionality,” 
Lord Justice Jackson rejected Lord Woolf ’s 2002 conclusion and recommended 
that the U.K. make a change: 
Disproportionate costs do not become proportionate because they were 
necessary. If the level of costs incurred is out of proportion to the circum-
stances of the case, they cannot become proportionate simply because they 
were “necessary” in order to bring or defend the claim. It will be re-
called . . . that the Legal Services Commission applies a cost/benefit test 
when deciding whether to support a case with public funds. Any self funding 
litigant would do the same. The fact that it was necessary to incur certain 
costs in order to prove or disprove a head of claim is obviously relevant, but 
it is not decisive of the question whether such costs were proportionate.137 
 
135 See ADRIAN AS ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-3 (2003) (describing the new 
code’s emphasis on proportionality as a “radical departure from past practice”). 
136 Home Office v. Lownds, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 365, [37] 1 W.L.R. 2450. 
137  RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 37 
(2009). Since the Jackson Report, the rules have been revised to include the following in Civil 
Procedure Rule 44.3(2): 
Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will—
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are 
disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasona-
bly or necessarily incurred; and (b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to wheth-
er costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and 
proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party. 
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It may be that American judges will increasingly be called upon to make 
such judgments in deciding what discovery should be ordered.138 A recent 
paper by Judge Wistrich and Professor Rachlinski suggests that such efforts 
may be necessary due to what they call “nonconsequentialist reasoning”—
“the heuristic that more information must be better, without regard for the 
cost of that information or the need for it”: 
Litigators thus suffer from a double distortion: they overvalue the additional 
information and undervalue the costs incurred by the responding party in 
providing the information. Lawyers also likely do not realize that the addi-
tional information might hinder or distort their own judgment.139 
Perhaps a reorientation could rekindle interest in more vigorous initial 
disclosure requirements. For their part, Judge Wistrich and Professor 
Rachlinski endorse that reform and favor tightening numerical limits on 
discovery and enhanced judicial management.140 The latter two were, of 
course, significant features of the 2013 package of proposed amendments.141 
IV. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 
The twentieth century concerns examined above are still with us, and we 
have added some twenty-first century concerns to their ranks. For one thing, 
debate about discovery does not seem likely to become more restrained. 
Already this year, the existing discovery rules have been attacked as “un-
 
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, 2013, S.I. 2013/262 (Eng. & Wales). For discussion of 
this effort, see John Sorabji, Prospects for Proportionality: Jackson Implementation, 32 CIV. JUST. Q. 
213 (2013).  
The issues raised in U.K. litigation are not the same as in American discovery, where the 
court has since 1983 been directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) to limit disproportionate 
discovery in advance. Thus, Professor Andrews has objected to the new U.K. regime on the 
ground that “proportionality is a criterion imposed after-the-event (as distinct from costs 
management exercised during the earlier stages of litigation in a particular case, or other ex ante 
constraints such as case management restrictions on the scope of the litigation and its intensity, or 
costs capping). Neil Andrews, On ‘Proportionate’ Costs 11 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal 
Stud., Research Paper No. 22/2014, 2014) (citation omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399061. 
138 A possible analogy is to the handling of requests for “disproportionate” attorneys’ fee 
awards in cases governed by a fee-shifting statute. For decades, “billing judgment” was to guide 
these decisions, but the basic problem continues. 
139 Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 
S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 604-06 (2013). 
140 Id. at 623-27. 
141 See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 267-68. It should be 
noted, however, that the numerical limit changes were removed after the public comment period.  
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American”142 and a proposed amendment designed to constrain discovery 
has faced the same criticism. 143  Meanwhile, some seem still to regard 
discovery and litigation as a way to shine a “spotlight” on practices they 
dislike,144 and the idea that there may be an important First Amendment 
right to obtain information through discovery and disseminate it may be 
returning.145 Perhaps taking such ideas to heart, a pro se litigant recently 
filed a suit in which one of his “counts” was for discovery. The district court 
dismissed, explaining that “discovery is not a claim one can make in a 
complaint; it is a process litigants undertake after they have filed their 
initial pleadings and dispositive motions.”146 Perhaps some things never 
change. 
Some developments, however, did occur. For example, defendants some-
times recognize that they too like American discovery. A striking example 
arose out of the venomous litigation against Chevron Corporation regarding 
pollution in Ecuador. Employing a statute enabling litigants to obtain 
discovery here for use in litigation outside this country,147 Chevron embarked 
on what the Third Circuit called a discovery effort “unique in the annals of 
American judicial history.”148 In a February 2013 law school conference about 
this litigation, a lawyer who has represented Chevron issued a warning to 
plaintiffs inclined to file such suits: “Even if you are a defendant litigating 
 
142 See Comments of Lawyers for Civil Justice, to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and 
the Discovery Subcommittee (Apr. 1, 2013) (stating that the American requirement that the 
responding party usually pays for the cost of responding to discovery is “the Un-American Rule”); 
see also Jessica D. Miller et al., Can E-Discovery Violate Due Process (Part 2), L. TECH. NEWS, June 
10, 2013, at 1 (arguing that “forcing a defendant to pay significant discovery expenses (without any 
contribution from the plaintiff )  absent any finding of liability arguably infringes the defendant’s 
right to due process”). 
143 Letter from John R. Cady & Christopher Aulepp, Cady Law Firm, LLC, to Jonathan 
Rose, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0263 (asserting that “[t]he proposed change to 
Rule 26(b) is un-American”). 
144 See, e.g., BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE 
LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT—AND WON 42 (2005) (referring to a national human 
rights litigator who “used litigation like a spotlight, dragging government officials and what he 
considered to be their wrongheaded policies into the glare”). 
145 See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2348168 (arguing that a recent Supreme Court statement breathes new life into the 
public access idea). For counterarguments, see Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality 
Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order 
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983).  
146 Finley v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976 (W.D. Tenn. 2012). 
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012). 
148 In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 282 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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in a foreign tribunal, discovery is available in the United States.”149 And a 
recent practitioners’ article on how to defend class actions suggested that 
discovery is a way for defendants to win such cases.150 
These issues continue to attract attention from on high. For example, in 
December 2011, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a 
hearing on the “Costs and Burdens of Civil Discovery.”151 Before the next 
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Chairman of this 
subcommittee wrote to the judges who head the Advisory Committee and 
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure expressing 
hope that the committees “will recommend enacting rule reforms to address 
the principal concerns discussed at the hearing. Such reforms would free 
Americans to devote their financial resources to job creation and more 
productive, economic uses.”152 
Proposed amendments had been under study since the Advisory Com-
mittee’s conference at Duke Law School in May 2010, and were published 
for public comment in August 2013.153 Much public commentary followed, 
showing that there is fervent disagreement on a number of points. It may be 
that the framers would have expected nothing less. But in at least two ways, 
the present issues probably differ from what they would have anticipated.  
A. The Digital Revolution 
We are regularly told that there has been a digital “revolution” and that 
everything is different as a result. For more than thirty years, computer 
technology has changed the way lawyers work. It remains unclear whether 
the legal profession will undergo a revolution as a result,154 although there is 
 
149 Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Ten Lessons From the Chevron Litigation: The Defense Perspective, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 219, 234 (2013) (capitalization altered for readability). 
150 See Kenneth Sulzer & Laura Reathaford, How to Defend Regional Class Actions, S.F. DAILY 
J., Aug. 23, 2013, at 5 (“Discovery is also often a battleground in litigating the size of the class and 
many times can be the ‘win’ the employer needs to get the case resolved.”). 
151 Costs and Burdens of Civil Discovery: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011). 
152 Letter from Rep. Trent Franks, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Judge Mark R. Kravitz, Chairman, U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. 
on Rules of Practice & Procedure, and Judge David G. Campbell, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory 
Comm. (Mar. 21, 2012). 
153 See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93. 
154 For ruminations on the subject, see Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the 
Legal Profession: Evolution or Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827 (2008). 
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a passable argument that digital technology has revolutionized the medical 
profession.155 
But there is good reason to conclude that digital technology has revolu-
tionized discovery in the last two decades or so. As recently as 2000, I was 
buttonholed by prominent litigators who urged that the Federal Rules be 
revised to state explicitly that email is discoverable; they told me that their 
corporate clients would not take their word for it. Fairly soon, Corporate 
America clearly got the word. In 2006, amendments were added to deal 
explicitly with discovery of this form of evidence.156 Rather quickly, most of 
the states adopted very similar provisions. 
Rule changes are not a sufficient measure of the prominence of  
e-discovery. A better measure is money. From next to nothing in 2000, an  
e-discovery industry has arisen that is expected to be worth $9.9 billion in 
2017.157 That figure does not represent attorneys’ fees, but rather the reve-
nues of e-discovery providers. True, this development is part of a larger 
information-management evolution,158 but it is a very large part. It is large 
enough to get the attention of law firms; many of them now have  
e-discovery departments. It is also large enough to get the attention of law 
schools; at least sixty of those now (like Hastings) offer courses in  
e-discovery. In 2012, the RAND Corporation published a study of the costs of 
e-discovery (and of the attorney time involved in reviewing its fruits) and 
concluded that only predictive coding offered the promise of significantly 
curbing those costs.159 Since then, predictive coding has been the hottest 
topic on the e-discovery market; many vendors tout their products as “the 
best.” 
This new industry meets a need, and that need is mainly fueled by 
American discovery, although governmental investigations and other 
activities play a part. In the era of television shows like CSI, it may seem to 
many jurors that every important activity leaves electronic footprints, so 
 
155 See Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 265-73 (2009) 
(contrasting the impact of computers on what doctors do). 
156 For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to 
E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004). 
157 See Sean Doherty, Research Group Claims E-Discovery Market to Reach $9.9B in 2017, L. 
TECH. NEWS, Aug. 9, 2013, available at LEXIS. Of that worldwide figure, $7.2 billion was forecast as 
the U.S. share. Id. 
158 See, e.g., Coping with Asian Languages in E-Discovery, Uncovering Fraud, Intrusions and More, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2013, at 22 (describing e-discovery technology that can 
also be used to detect hacking and fraud). 
159 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDER-
STANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 97-99 (2012). 
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that they should be presented with digital evidence (ideally video footage) 
to prove what happened. Certainly the remarkable use of video footage to 
identify the bombers in the Boston Marathon bombing attack illustrated 
how important this material can be to resolving disputes that end up in 
court. Similarly, the furor about NSA spying on email and related commu-
nication activity that followed Edward Snowden’s leaks underscores how 
much “confidential” information Americans commit to digital memory. 
The framers were probably up-to-date on technological innovations of 
their time that affected law practice in general and litigation in particular, 
and they probably also marveled at how much practice had changed in their 
lifetimes. But when they talked about the burdens of discovery, they spoke 
mainly of the intrusion it threatened.160 In the age before the photocopier 
and the electronic typewriter, the quantity of documents that existed by the 
1970s would not be imaginable. The mass use of computers since the 1980s 
has compounded the amount of possibly discoverable information 
manyfold. And things continue to change; a 2013 survey of in-house counsel 
reported that nearly all expect e-discovery to be different in 2015.161 
Unless one entirely rejects the proportionality notions explored above,162 
this change must affect how discovery is conducted. If predictive coding 
achieves reliability and acceptance, it may in a sense supplant the Rule 34 
request, for the real focus will be on the algorithm, not the request, and the 
undertaking will be to produce information identified by the algorithm, not 
on producing “each and every” item described by the request.163 Already, 
courts are beginning to require parties to agree on search terms used to 
identify responsive information, seemingly recognizing that at least this 
“first cut” technique is essential to sensible discovery in the Digital Age.164 
We have not seen the end of this evolution. 
 
160 See Subrin, supra note 4, at 721-22 (describing concerns). 
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(AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM NOW) 4 (2013), available at http://www.legaltechnology.com/wp-
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in-house legal professionals interviewed in a survey expect “e-discovery to be different in 2015”). 
162 See supra Section III.B. 
163 On this score, consider the recent observation by an experienced e-discovery practitioner: 
In effect, requesting parties regard an agreement to use queries as an agreement to 
treat those queries as requests for production. Producing parties who reject this 
thinking would nevertheless be wise to plan for opponents (and judges) who em-
brace it. 
Craig Ball, Are Keywords Just Filters?, L. TECH. NEWS, June 1, 2013, at 25, available at LEXIS. 
164 See, e.g., William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 
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But we can see that the advent of the Digital Age makes it more im-
portant to take account of proportionality concerns. That may be expressing 
itself first with regard to preservation. For reasons that are not entirely 
clear, preservation has become an extremely hot topic in litigation. As the 
person responsible for the discovery volumes of Federal Practice & Procedure, 
I have the pleasure each year of reading all reported federal discovery-
related decisions, and I can report that the volume of sanctions motions 
regarding preservation has surged. As the Federal Judicial Center has 
reported,165 there are still few decisions imposing severe sanctions for loss of 
evidence. Partly due to advertising efforts by vendors of preservation 
software, however, those decisions get a great deal of attention, and reports 
of extremely broad and expensive preservation abound. Partly as a result, 
the pending amendments package contains a proposed amendment to Rule 
37 designed to guide preservation sanctions decisions. 166  The ultimate 
upshot of this effort cannot be predicted now. Similarly, it is not possible to 
say whether further rule changes will result from the advent of the Digital 
Age, but it is clear that this new era has produced a new discovery atmos-
phere. 
B. The Rest of the World 
“[A] lot of foreign companies like the U.S. judicial system. They like it for its openness, 
its fairness, and its vigorous discovery rules.” 
               —John Bace167 
The above endorsement of American discovery is jarring; from what we 
are regularly told, foreign companies do not embrace our “vigorous discovery 
rules.” To the contrary, the conventional view is that most of the rest of the 
world regards U.S. discovery as anathema. It is certainly possible to argue 
 
about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and cooperation with opposing counsel 
in designing search terms or ‘keywords’ to be used to produce email and other electronically stored 
information.”). 
165 See EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS BASED 
UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES (2011) (reporting on review of court dockets 
showing very low frequency of imposition of sanctions for spoliation). 
166 See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 314-28. Note that this 
proposal was revised after the public comment period. 
167 Cope with Complex Asian Issues Affecting E-Discovery by Using a Full-Service Provider, MET-
ROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2013, at 14. 
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that the rest of the world is wrong; there is an entire book by a Korean 
scholar making just that argument.168 
For a long time, partly due to our exceptional discovery practices, the 
United States has practiced exceptionalism in procedure.169 Particularly in 
relation to discovery, we may have to reconsider that parochial attitude. For 
some, the assumption seems to be that God granted the broadest of discov-
ery, or at least that broad discovery is a critical attribute of a civilized 
nation. Undoubtedly it has become a striking feature of this nation, but 
largely because of the revolution wrought by the framers of the Federal 
Rules. Fervent efforts to preserve this status quo seem somewhat like efforts 
to preserve every aspect of the “social contract” in Western European 
nations where it has come under stress.170 
Except in times of global warming, it is risky to set up camp in front of a 
glacier, for halting the progress of a glacier is too difficult.171 The “American 
century” is over; at least some compromise with the prevailing attitude 
toward discovery in the rest of the world is worth considering. It is striking 
that some who otherwise oppose American unilateralism and exceptionalism 
in many areas embrace it with regards to discovery, thinking that our view is 
close to our essence as a people.172 Even if one fully embraces that notion, it 
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The Socialists have become a conservative party, desperately trying to preserve the 
victories of the last century. Many in the party, like the anti-globalization campaigner 
Arnaud Montebourg, now the minister in charge of industrial renewal—let alone 
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at A6. 
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172 This perspective can be supported by reference to a number of political theories. For 
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is difficult to believe that proportionality really goes out the window in 
service to the overriding importance of discovery at any cost. If the attitude 
toward preservation that some plaintiffs’ lawyers endorse for corporate 
defendants were applied also to individual plaintiffs, many of them would 
be found wanting. Some swords have two edges. 
More immediately, American discovery and attendant preservation are 
coming under increasing foreign pressure in the name of privacy. The 
Snowden disclosures have called to the attention of the larger electorate a 
dissonance between the U.S. attitude and the E.U. attitude toward privacy 
that has for some time bubbled in the background of American discovery. 
Increasingly, E.U. privacy directives forbid “processing” of digital data that 
American preservation law encourages or requires. Needless to say, actual 
production of the information also offends the E.U. privacy directives. 
It is easy to inveigh against these European attitudes. Thus, two Ameri-
can plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote an article entitled Hiding Across the Atlantic, 
warning that “[a]n American company that disseminates defective products 
in the United States, where we have liberal discovery rules, may attempt to 
hide behind the narrower foreign laws that protect an associated entity to 
prevent important discovery.”173 They argue that “[t]he plaintiff bar should 
be aware of this pernicious tactic and be armed with a strategy for a strong 
response.”174 
But it is not so easy for enterprises that operate in both the United 
States and the European Union to shrug off the European attitude toward 
privacy.175 One can ascribe the difference to the European experience with 
totalitarianism in the twentieth century, but that does not make it go away; 
even general interest publications have focused on it.176 Thus, American 
corporations increasingly have a position called “chief privacy officer” whose 
job is attending to the legal requirements around the globe that corporations 
doing business in various countries adhere to their differing versions of 
privacy. Although some may regard “multinational” as an epithet,177 it seems 
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that we will have to adjust to companies doing business across borders. And 
legal institutions are beginning to take note as well.178 
This is not to say that American procedure should be revised to match 
the procedures of other nations,179 but it does recognize that much that is 
distinctive about American procedure—not only broad discovery but also 
relaxed pleading and class actions (as fortified by rule amendment in 
1966)—derives from what the framers did. The framers probably did not 
look beyond our shores (except for an occasional glance to England), but 
that attitude seems harder to justify in the twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
“Our procedural ancestors discussed discovery problems, but rejected most of the 
solutions. This may now be a luxury we cannot afford.” 
              —Stephen Subrin180 
As we commune with the shades of the framers, we are also contemplating 
another set of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules regarding discov-
ery.181 Edward Bellamy was looking for utopia, and he found it in his 
imaginary twenty-first century. Although it has been said that the framers 
of the Federal Rules “held a utopian combination of hopes about the gains 
from discovery,”182 as hard-headed lawyers they likely did not expect utopia 
to emerge by now. Bellamy posited a twenty-first century world in which 
human conflict had disappeared because humans had evolved beyond it. 
Being litigators, the framers probably did not even entirely want the world 
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to move beyond human conflict, and they almost certainly did not expect it 
would do so. 
We live in the actual twenty-first century, and we know that human 
conflict has not stopped. We may therefore need to confront the question of 
whether we can still afford the “luxury” of postponing solutions to discovery 
problems. This Essay has identified four varieties of litigation that have 
been important since the framers did their work but probably did not exist 
at that time.183 It has also noted the two seemingly new ideas about discov-
ery that have emerged in the last seventy-five years,184 and two important 
forces that have emerged since the framers did their work.185 Meanwhile, as 
Professor Yeazell has recently noted, the contest about procedural reform 
often seems to degenerate into somewhat cartoonish posing with “[s]ome 
view[ing] civil litigation as the vindicator of rights, a way of speaking truth 
to power, and a guarantor of democratic values and freedoms. Others see 
civil litigation as a deadweight loss, a stick in the wheels of commerce, and a 
source of national shame.”186 For those who seek actual reforms of the 
American litigation system, the challenge is to navigate between Scylla and 
Charybdis, and “reforming” discovery is likely to remain a central activity. 
I began by asking whether the framers would be disconcerted by the actual 
twenty-first century as Edward Bellamy probably would have been had he 
been able to visit it. I suspect they might find some things striking and 
possibly unnerving, but they would not find current litigation realities 
nearly so surprising. Let us try to live up to their example as we move forward. 
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